Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T he federal welfare reform statute, enacted in 1996, had ambitious goals for changing the behavior of single women with children-the largest group of adults receiving cash assistance through the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Rapidly falling caseloads have been widely reported, suggesting significant progress towards the goal of reducing welfare dependency. Yet, the federal welfare law and the 50 state responses to that law reflect a broader set of objectives than just reducing caseloads. Those goals include making families "self-sufficient," reducing outof-wedlock births, and promoting marriage.
When it was created in 1935, AFDC was exclusively an income support program, since the children of widows and women whose husbands were absent or "incapacitated" were the primary beneficiaries, and their mothers were not expected to work. Of course, social attitudes towards women's participation in the labor force-and more specifically of low-income single women with children-have changed dramatically since that time. As a result, work programs and job training were added to the original AFDC program. Yet, as recently as the early 1990s, exemptions from work requirements were quite broad. A sea of policy changes began with state waivers granted in the 1990s prior to recent welfare reform and culminated in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). Federal and state policies now clearly express that work is expected of low-income single mothers with children.
The conservative critique of the old welfare system was based largely on the incentives it created. Welfare was viewed as structurally inconsistent with the social values of work and marriage. While there was never much evidence to support the claim that these incentives actually translated into socially undesirable behavior, the critique struck an important chord and was partially responsible for the demise of the AFDC program.
If a primary goal of welfare reform is to change behavior, the use of incentives is a natural tool. The incentives welfare recipients or potential welfare recipients face are affected by how welfare programs are designed and by how tax policy is structured. This paper explores the relationship between tax policy and the goals of welfare reform. It first sets forth the set of objectives that underlie welfare reform. It then provides a brief overview of the policy changes states and the federal government have made in the design of welfare programs to encourage different behavior. Next it looks at recent changes in tax policies and explores whether or not those changes are consistent with the changes in welfare policy, at least in theory. It then examines the practical relationship, or lack thereof, between these policies. Finally, it provides comment on the relative merits of using tax policy as opposed to programmatic design to effect changes in behavior.
This paper arises from the belief that those who formulate and evaluate welfare-reform policies need to pay more attention to how tax policies toward lowincome families integrate with their expenditure-side counterparts. Analysis of welfare must go beyond the mix of cash and services provided to help welfare recipients get and hold jobs (e.g., training, child care assistance, transportation) and the sanctions used to make it difficult to remain on welfare without actively pursuing work. Welfare analysts need to also look at tax policy in the context of existing expenditure-side programs and the goals of welfare reform. Do the policies intentionally relate to each other, as supplements or substitutes, or is their coexistence haphazard?
This paper also arises from the belief that those in the tax policy community need to understand and explore the expanded use of tax policy to achieve social policy objectives related to work and welfare. More and more social policy is being coordinated through the tax system. The federal earned income tax credit (EITC) is the most significant tax program affecting low-income families, providing up to $3,816 per year (for tax year 1999) in cash assistance to low-income families with two or more children. The EITC is now a larger item in the federal budget than Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the new welfare program. In recent years, states have also initiated or significantly expanded their own EITCs . In addition, some states have been innovative in their creation of different types of low-income tax credits that the federal system lacks.
THE GOALS OF WELFARE REFORM
The goals of PRWORA as stated in the legislation are to end dependency of needy parents on government benefits, reduce out-of-wedlock births, promote family formation, and assist needy families (U.S. Congress, 1996) . In addition, PRWORA is explicitly designed to increase state flexibility in the administration of the program. Most state statutes and rules echo the goals of the federal statute, although some states have adopted additional goals for their own programs.
Reducing Welfare Dependence
To some welfare reform advocates, reducing the welfare caseloads is a good in and of itself. Data show that children in families receiving welfare are worse off than children in similarly situated families not on welfare (Hill and O'Neill, 1994) . Despite the absence of data that demonstrate a causal link between welfare receipt and worse conditions for children, some believe this to be true (Rector and Youssef, 1999) . For these advocates, reducing welfare caseloads is a positive phenomenon in and of itself.
Political leaders also cite falling caseloads as evidence of welfare reform's success (Administration for Children and Families, 1998) . Presumably this is because in the public's eye lower welfare caseloads imply that families are experiencing reduced hardship and poverty. Survey data show that most Americans support a broader notion of the goals of welfare reform than just caseload reduction.
1 Americans strongly hold the view that needy children should receive assistance. They are concerned that welfare may be a disincentive to work, but they want to help those who need it.
One term that captures the goal of helping those in need is the desire for families to reach "self-sufficiency," a goal many states include in their new welfare plans.
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Unfortunately, this term is rarely defined. A goal of self-sufficiency in its strictest form might imply holding a job with an income where no additional government supports are necessary. Yet, many states are expanding social supports such as medical assistance and child care assistance. So long as cash assistance caseloads are falling, even if other supports are expanding, states and the public seem to view this as a success. This suggests that, operationally, self-sufficiency is being defined fairly narrowly as the absence of cash assistance, not the absence of government support of any kind.
Reducing Out-of-Wedlock Births and Promoting Family Formation
Welfare reform arose in part out of the seemingly inexorable trend of increased rates of non-marital births. Birth rates among unmarried women ages 15-44 peaked in 1994, and although the rate has since decreased, the percentage of births that are non-marital has remained nearly unchanged (Ventura et al., 1999) . The structure of the old AFDC program was viewed as inconsistent with the goal of promoting marital births. The requirement of an "absent or incapacitated parent" made benefits available to singleparent families, but not married couples in identical financial circumstances. As the AFDC caseload became dominated by never-married mothers, as opposed to the widows and divorcees that were the original target population, the sense that AFDC promoted out-of-wedlock births could not be avoided.
The role of public policy in determining social trends such as marriage and non-marital births is not clear. Whether or not AFDC actually encouraged non-marital births was the subject of much research and debate.
3 Still, so long as it could be shown that AFDC created certain socially undesirable incentives, it did not matter that the actual effects of those incentives on human behavior could not be established. The PRWORA statute describes at length the social costs of non-marital births and has as a goal reducing the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies.
Improving the Economic Well-Being of Children
While parents' behavior is the target of most welfare programs, children are the 1 A survey by the W.K. Kellogg Foundation (1999) found that respondents ranked the goals of eliminating fraud and abuse, reducing child poverty, and increasing self-sufficiency as more important than the goal of reducing the welfare rolls. 2 Unpublished work by the Urban Institute indicates that 40 states explicitly declare the goal of "encouraging self-sufficiency" in their state TANF plan as submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services. 3 See, for example Murray (1984) , McLanahan et al., (1985) , and Ellwood and Bane (1984) . titular beneficiaries. The conflict between wanting to support children in need, but not encouraging adverse behaviors by their parents, is inevitable. The path from program design to children's well-being is often not explicit, but the goal of improving the well-being of children is a fundamental component of welfare policy.
When originally enacted, the previously existing welfare program was called Aid to Dependent Children. In 1962 the name was changed to Aid to Families with Dependent Children. The new Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program states the goal of assisting "needy families so that children may be cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives." The language reflects an emphasis on family as the source of support for children. This emphasis is confirmed in the behavioral expectations placed on adults who care for children, with the presumption that work-oriented adult behavior will yield improved welfare for children.
PROGRAM CHANGES THAT SUPPORT THE GOALS OF WELFARE REFORM
Welfare reform led to a new set of program rules and expenditures designed to achieve the program's objectives. The program includes a series of behavioral requirements for adults. Welfare benefits are available for only five years over the course of an adult's lifetime. Benefits cannot be received for more than two years without the adult participating in a work activity. Both of these limits can be made even tighter by states, and many have done so. While these requirements are central to the new welfare system, this paper focuses on how tax policy and program design create incentives that support the objectives of welfare reform. This section describes the features of the new welfare system that create incentives for families to behave in manners consistent with the objectives of the new law.
Policies To Reduce Dependence
The primary incentives for families to work come from expanded income and other supports for those who go to work.
Expanded Income Disregards
The rate at which cash benefits phaseout as a person begins to have earnings has a significant effect on the incentives that person has to begin and continue working. The AFDC program followed the "thirty and a third" rule, which excluded for the first four months the first $30 of earnings, and one-third of earnings beyond that when determining the amount of a family's cash grant (U.S. House of Representatives, 1998) . Behind this fairly simple rule were many variations and complexities. Some expenditures for work-related activities, such as child care, could be excluded from income. Some states received waivers to increase the amount of income disregarded. And the structure of incentives was different in "fill in the gap" states where the cash grant did not equal the state's own determination of the minimum amount of income a family required to meet its basic needs (see Acs et al., 1998) .
State income disregard policies have changed substantially under the new TANF program. They retain their complexity, but the direction of change has been unambiguous. In most states, more income is disregarded in setting cash grants than was the case under the AFDC program (Acs et al., 1998) . Therefore, as the adult in a family goes to work, she can keep a larger share of her cash grant to supplement her earnings. This lower effective tax rate creates a greater incentive to work.
Work Supports
Under AFDC, all families receiving welfare automatically received medical assistance and were guaranteed child care if they were working. Most recipients also received food stamps (U.S. House of Representatives, 1998) . The legal structure underlying these supports has now changed. States must continue to provide medical assistance to families that met the welfare rules as they existed at the time PRWORA was passed. As a practical matter, most states provide Medicaid to all of their current TANF recipients. 4 The federal guarantee of child care no longer exists, but states may not enforce work requirements against single-parent families that cannot find child care. Eligibility for food stamps continues to be determined jointly with welfare. Thus, the major work supports for welfare recipients that existed under AFDC continue to exist for families now on TANF.
The more interesting development is the expansion of many of these services to families that are not on welfare. Since the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, federal law has extended Medicaid to children and pregnant women with low incomes who are not receiving cash assistance. Federal law requires states to provide transitional medical assistance for a year to most families that leave welfare to go to work. The new State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) is designed to cover children in working families with incomes higher than most state's welfare programs reach. A few states are also considering significant expansions of Medicaid coverage using Section 1931 of the Social Security Act, part of the new PRWORA law, that allows states to provide insurance to all members of an eligible family, not just children.
It is harder to document the degree of change in child care assistance under PRWORA. The law repealed the federal requirement that states provide transitional assistance to families that had recently left welfare. Yet, child care has been one of the first areas to benefit from the large sums of money available to states under PRWORA. While the federal guarantee is gone, states have shown great interest in expanding child care assistance. No systematic data are yet available to show the level of state and federal spending on child care, but where this information is available the levels of spending have increased.
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Countering these expansive trends are administrative barriers working families confront in obtaining the benefits for which they are eligible. Food stamps and medical assistance-two programs designed to reach well beyond families receiving welfare-experienced falling caseloads in the first years after welfare reform (Ku and Bruen, 1999; Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999) . Participation rates are disappointingly low for families that have left welfare yet remain eligible for these programs. This phenomenon reflects the prominent role cash assistance has played historically in outreach and enrollment for these other services. It also reflects the bias these programs have in serving nonworking families, with their application processes and office hours making them difficult to navigate for people holding jobs. Presumably over time these administrative issues will be worked out. Until then, a set of services designed to support working families are not reaching many of those who could benefit from them.
Improving Human Capital
In addition to financial benefits to working, states can encourage work by making available to those in need the training and job assistance that make employment more likely. There is a general expectation that states experiencing large caseload declines will devote more of their resources to meeting the needs of those who 4 Studies involving a limited number of states show that most states are making TANF recipients automatically eligible for Medicaid. See Ellwood and Ku (1998) and the General Accounting Office (1998) for further detail. 5 For example, see research by Ellwood and Boyd (2000) on spending in four states, all of which have increased funding for child care since the passage of welfare reform.
face more significant barriers to finding work. Services directed at substance abuse, meeting basic housing needs, reaching victims of domestic violence, or providing remedial education may increase the likelihood that some welfare families could move into the labor force. At this point there are no clear data to show a significant investment in this regard. Still, it is a natural next step if states find themselves continuing to have large TANF surpluses. An additional source of support for improving human capital comes from the new Welfare to Work program. It is specifically targeted at improving job retention and upward mobility in the labor force. It is also a source of funds that can be used to reach the non-custodial parents of needy children (Trutko et al., 1999) .
Enhanced Child Support Enforcement
Child support payments play a significant role in providing material resources to children. Child support efforts have increased dramatically in the last 16 years.
6 PRWORA required states to adopt a number of measures designed to increase child support collections. At the same time, the statute eliminated the $50 pass through requirement. That provision required states to give the first $50 of child support payments to the custodial parent on welfare, while the balance of the support payment was kept by the state to offset welfare costs. Eliminating this provision reduces incentives for obtaining child support, but despite its repeal in federal law, 22 states have retained the pass through (Sorenson and Halpern, 1999) . In addition, a few states have expanded the pass through to expand incentives for active participation in child support efforts.
State Incentives
All of these incentives for families are reinforced by federal provisions that create incentives for states to move families to work. The PRWORA statute requires states to have 50 percent of all families and 90 percent of their two-parent families on welfare working by FY 2002. These targets are reduced by one percentage point for every point decline in the state's welfare rolls. With the large declines that occurred in the years following welfare, these requirements have been easy to meet. But in the longer run, as caseloads cycle up and down, these provisions will keep the pressure on states to emphasize work in their welfare programs. Further, PRWORA distributes $200 million in bonuses each year through FY 2003 among the top ten states in each of four job performance categories.
Policies Promoting Family Formation
As noted above, AFDC was available to low-income parents when the second parent was incapacitated. Since absence met the definition of incapacity, the program was viewed by its detractors as creating disincentives for parents to marry. One step prior to PRWORA designed to address this issue was the requirement that all states adopt an AFDC-U program by October 1990. This program provided eligibility to families where the "incapacitated" parent was unemployed, thereby eliminating a portion of the program's bias against married families. This small step has been expanded significantly under PRWORA.
Coverage of Two-Parent Families
The federal law now permits states to treat two-parent families the same as they treat single-parent families. That is, if the family meets the income requirements for welfare eligibility, it can receive benefits whether one or two parents are present. While this addresses the structural bias of the program, as a practical matter it is of limited effect. This is because very few two-parent families have income low enough to qualify for welfare benefits (unless the non caretaking parent is unemployed, in which case the family should already have been eligible for benefits under the old AFDC-U rules).
A related change accomplished administratively by the Department of Health and Human Services was the elimination of the so-called one hundred hour rule.
7 This rule capped the amount the second adult in a household could work at one hundred hours per quarter and still be considered unemployed, and therefore "incapacitated," for the purposes of AFDC. Although AFDC has been repealed, this rule change is important for Medicaid, since Medicaid eligibility rules are tied to previously existing AFDC rules. The effect of the change was to permit some low-income two-parent families to obtain Medicaid coverage.
Requirements for Minor Parents
PRWORA bars minor parents from receiving benefits unless they live with their parents or in another structured setting. This policy is in response to the concern that AFDC served as an incentive for young women wishing to move out of their parent's house to have children. Under AFDC, this young parent received a cash benefit for her separate household if she lived separately from her parents. The new law prevents benefits from being paid in this circumstance. The goal is to reduce the incentive for young women to have children as a vehicle for gaining financial independence, and, if they do have children, to assure that welfare does not make it easier for them to live on their own.
Performance Bonus for States
As with incentives to work, the PRWORA statute provides one hundred million dollars per year in direct incentives for states to achieve objectives with respect to family formation. Up to five states each year can receive a share of the bonus for experiencing the largest reduction in the number of out-of-wedlock births without a corresponding increase in the number of abortions.
THE INCREASING ROLE OF TAX POLICY IN WELFARE REFORM
A common perception is that tax policy primarily affects high-income families, while transfer policy is used to redistribute resources to the lower-income population. That is too simplistic a view. Tax policy affects low-income families in two ways. First, some taxes burden all families, either because they are tied to consumption or because they are based on income but are not designed to exempt the lowest-income people. Second, and our focus in this paper, the tax system can be used to assist people, and it is being used increasingly in such a way for low-income populations. This is accomplished through targeted tax credits that often share the objectives of welfare reform. Moreover, the lines between tax credits and expenditure-side subsidy programs have become increasingly blurred due to the new rules that are part of the new welfare law.
More "Refundable" Credits Means More Lower-Income People Can Benefit A single-parent, poverty-level family (income of $13,423 in 1999) is exempt from federal personal income taxes, and from state personal income taxes in the majority of states.
8 As such, many features of income tax systems, such as itemized de-ductions and "nonrefundable" tax credits, benefit poverty-level families very little. But exempted families can still be affected by income tax policy if "refundable" credits-credits that can more than offset tax liability-are available to them.
Federal EITC
The federal EITC is a refundable tax credit that benefits low-to middle-income families who have earned income. For tax year 1999 it is worth a maximum of $2,312 for families with one child and earned income in the $6,800 to $12,460 range, and a maximum of $3,816 for families with two or more children and earned incomes in the $9,540 to $12,460 range. Childless families at very low earned incomes qualify for a very small EITC; the maximum of $347 is available to those with earned incomes between $4,530 and $5,670 and the credit is reduced to zero when earned income reaches just around $10,000. In all cases the credit has a phasein range (over which the credit rises with earned income), a plateau range (over which the value of the credit is constant), and a phase-out range (over which the credit falls as earned income rises, and eventually is completely phased out). The value of these credits depends on earned income level and number of children, but not on filing status or number of adults in the household. For tax year 1999, the credit is completely phased out at an earned income of $26,928 for families with one child, and at $30,580 for families with two or more children.
State-Level EITCs
In recent years there has been tremendous growth in state-level EITCs, in size and number.
9 Twelve states now have their own EITC. About half of these "piggyback" directly on the federal EITC. They are smaller versions of the federal credit (most in the 5 to 25 percent range), they are refundable, and they distinguish among no-child, one-child, and two-ormore-children families in the benefits they pay. In eight of the 12 states with EITCs, the credit is refundable. The two states with the most generous refundable EITCs deviate slightly from the federal structure. Wisconsin offers relatively more generous benefits to larger families. As a percentage of the federal credit, one-child families receive 4 percent, two-child families receive 14 percent, and three-or-morechildren families receive 43 percent. Minnesota's benefit-by-income schedule adds a second phase-in and plateau, to avoid the high effective marginal tax rates often confronting families right around poverty level. Their second phase-in means the high effective tax rates are pushed off to slightly higher income families, but are not avoided completely (see Maag and Rogers, 2000) .
Other Refundable Tax Credits
While the EITC is the only refundable tax credit available to most low-income families through the federal income tax (the "child tax credit" based on number of children is only refundable for families with three or more children), several states provide other types of refundable, targeted credits where no equivalent exists at the federal level. For example, several states have refundable child care credits, in contrast to the federal version that is nonrefundable. Typically the move to refundability goes along with increased targeting of the credit toward lower-income families (again, see Maag and Rogers, 2000) . Very few states use both a refundable EITC and a refundable childcare tax credit. Of the 13 states with either of these refundable credits, only two (New York and Minnesota) have both. Finally, some states have created completely new types of refundable credits. For example, Minnesota has a new refundable (and targeted) credit for certain types of educational expenses.
Why Many of these Credits Are Consistent with the Goals of Welfare Reform
These refundable tax credits create certain incentives that seem consistent with the goals of welfare reform to encourage work and not encourage single-parenthood. First, the EITC was designed explicitly, at least in part, to encourage work (over no work), and other credits, such as child-care credits, subsidize work-related activity. The EITC encourages labor-force participation by requiring at least some amount of earnings in order to qualify. In the phase-in range, the EITC functions like a wage subsidy; as labor hours are increased, the EITC benefit increases along with increased earnings. These incentives to increase labor activity disappear, however, once a family is on or past the plateau range of the credit. Empirical evidence does indicate that the EITC encourages work for single mothers but might discourage work for married mothers (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Ellwood, 1999; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000) .
Child-care credits, even when refundable, reach only a subset of the working poor population, but represent a targeted benefit to a group requiring assistance. Although eligibility is not solely based on earned income (working is usually a necessary but not sufficient characteristic to receive these credits-the family must be paying child-care expenses, too), the need for a family to incur child care costs is certainly positively related to work. A family receiving the EITC but not their state's refundable child-care credit is likely using informal (non-paid) child care or has one parent at home, so their not qualifying for the credit simply reflects their lack of such costs.
Second, EITC benefits go to both twoparent and single-parent families, and thus do not encourage single-parenthood. The benefit is calculated based upon family income and the number of children, but not on filing or marital status. As others have documented, a "marriage penalty" can occur when a single, working parent marries another working adult, due to the phasing out of the credit at higher income levels. But "marriage bonuses" exist too, when a non-working single parent marries a childless working adult. It should be recognized that some "penalty" is inevitable when a benefit is based on family, not individual, resources.
10 Despite this mix of penalties and bonuses, the EITC avoids the problem of the old AFDC rules that clearly disadvantaged married families.
New Tax Credits Encouraged via New
Block Grant (TANF) Rules, State Budget Rules, and the "Good Times" for State Government Budgets
It is an opportune time for states to use targeted tax credits as a low-income transfer mechanism. PRWORA requires states to maintain a portion of their expenditures under AFDC. With caseloads falling rapidly, this can be difficult if states do not increase spending in areas other than cash benefits. However, the new TANF regulations permit states to count refundable credits toward their "maintenance of effort" (MOE) or to use their federal block grant funds to pay for such credits (see Schott et al., 1999) . Therefore, refundable credits can meet two goals of states: assisting low-income families and meeting federal requirements related to TANF.
In addition, most states have been enjoying significant revenue growth in recent years (Merriman, forthcoming) . Some states also have laws or constitutional provisions limiting spending or revenues (Penner and Weisner, forthcoming) . This combination of factors makes refundable tax credits appealing. While most states are forecasting continued budget surpluses in the foreseeable future, these credits may become hard to sustain when the economy weakens. Some states are very explicit in making these credits conditional on the good times. For example, Colorado's EITC was first put in place as an "intermittent" or "trigger" EITC, which only takes effect when the state's constitutional revenue limitation ceiling is exceeded. The legislation approving New York's recent expansion of their EITC explicitly conditions the credit on the continued availability of TANF funds to finance the expansion.
HOW EXPENDITURE-AND TAX-BASED APPROACHES TO WELFARE REFORM DIFFER
In general, expenditure-side programs and targeted tax credits are emphasizing the same broad goals of welfare reform: to increase family income while encouraging work, and to promote family formation (or not reward singleparenthood). But a closer consideration of how expenditure-based and taxbased approaches to welfare reform compare suggests there are still many differences, which we discuss in this section. These are often more subtle distinctions that together imply that the expenditure-side and tax-side programs cannot be considered perfect substitutes.
Targeting Breadth
EITCs tend to go to a broader (higher) income range of families than do most expenditure-based forms of cash assistance. The large majority of cash assistance goes to families with incomes below (often far below) the poverty line. Medical assistance and child care support may go to higher-income families-other than health insurance for children, these programs rarely reach families above 200 percent of poverty-about where the EITC phases out. Since most state EITCs follow the federal structure, this greater breadth is reflected in state policies as well.
The federal child care tax credit goes to an even broader income range. It is basically universal in that it phases down very slightly to a minimum benefit as income rises, rather than phasing out completely. In fact, lowest-income families are the least likely to benefit because the credit is nonrefundable. As mentioned earlier, several states have adopted refundable, more targeted versions of the child care credit.
Targeting Specificity
Tax credits define "need" much more simply than do expenditure-side programs, because the information is collected on a tax form rather than in a face-to-face interview. The information collected on a tax form is a fairly crude measure of a family's need for support in general or for particular types of support. For example, the EITC distinguishes family need according to earned income and among 0-, 1-child, and 2+ child families, regardless of the age of the children or any other special needs of the family, and without evaluation of the actual work opportunities (including capability of increasing work effort) the parents face.
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Compare this with the old AFDC rules, 11 For most low-income families, EITC eligibility and benefits only depend on earned income. But certain forms of capital income can make a family ineligible for the EITC (if the amount exceeds a threshold of around $2,000), and can be counted toward the phase-out of the credit for families in the phase-out range.
only some of which have been simplified under TANF. Generally, eligibility hinges upon the earnings and assets of the applicant and others in the household. In addition, spending on some basic needs is excluded from the eligibility calculation. Whether this additional complexity is good or not, it is certainly a more common feature of expenditure programs than it is of tax credits. Interestingly, welfare reform has made the EITC and welfare payments more similar in one important regard-they are both tied to work. This alignment reinforces the social message, but also means fewer supports are available for the nonworking poor than were available prior to welfare reform.
The Type of Assistance
Even if they reached the identical set of families, tax credits would differ from other programs because the only thing they can deliver to families is money. While much of the political debate over welfare focuses on cash benefits, families in need are often given a variety of kinds of support, only some of which are like cash. For example, welfare programs assist families in finding jobs, make referrals for child care, and link families with non-governmental sources of support. In the best circumstances, caseworkers can identify family needs and help the family identify resources that will meet those needs. None of these functions can be performed through the tax code.
The Timing of Assistance
The timing of tax credits differs from the timing of expenditure-side assistance; the time horizon for tax credits is much longer-annual, rather than monthly. "Need" as defined by the tax system is evaluated on an annual basis, on a tax form filled out once a year. Although an advance payment option to receive payments monthly is available with the federal EITC, few recipients take advantage of that option, because many fear owing taxes at year 's end (Alstott, 1995) . The longer time horizon likely weakens the link between the EITC and actual work behavior because people do not sense the annual incentives or disincentives as much, when they make decisions over shorter time intervals. It also means the EITC cannot meet urgent needs, unlike emergency assistance programs that evaluate a family's circumstances quickly.
Because EITC checks are typically received once a year instead of once a month, recipients may use the subsidies differently from other forms of assistance. One fear is that people treat the EITC more like a windfall than an income supplement, and hence are more likely to spend it in frivolous ways. But some empirical evidence suggests that EITC recipients treat at least part of the annual payment as "forced savings," and use it to pay off debt, contribute to savings accounts, pay for education, and build up their stock of durable goods (see Smeeding et al., 1999; and Romich and Weisner, 1999) . This suggests that the EITC differs from monthly forms of assistance in acting as a boost to permanent income and longer-run well being, rather than as a way of smoothing out transitory income.
Finally, as was mentioned earlier, under the new welfare rules most expenditure-side benefits and services (programs serving the same purpose the old AFDC program used to) are subject to family time limits and work requirements.
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While the emphasis in welfare is now on temporary assistance, a family can claim the EITC or child credit year after year, without limit.
The Phase-Out Problem
While work-related tax credits are quite effective in making work pay as a family moves from welfare to some work, effective marginal tax rates become fairly high as families move to a more significant wage. This tempers the value of these credits as work-promotion devices. But the option of extending benefits further up the income scale is expensive, and would be viewed by some as inconsistent with the goal of family self-sufficiency. Also, extending the phase-out range does not necessarily increase work incentives, because while it reduces effective tax rates for those who were already in the range, it increases effective tax rates (and incomes) for those who would be newly in the phase-out range. It should be recognized that phase-outs are inevitable with targeted policies, whether done on the expenditure or tax sides of the budget.
One design concern is that having expenditure programs and tax credits phase out over the same income range may create very high effective tax rates and work disincentives within that range. The alignment of these policies requires further research. In addition, we still know too little about how or whether these disincentives actually affect work effort over different income ranges.
There are other characteristics of EITCs and other work-conditioned tax credits, however, that might cause tax credits to affect work incentives differently from traditional means-tested expenditure programs. As mentioned above, the annual horizon of tax credits may reduce shortrun labor supply responses (positive or negative). Also, the "phase-in" portion of the EITC means the work disincentive operates only at higher income ranges when people move from poverty-level to higher earnings, not when moving from no earnings to some earnings. Alstott (1995) asks if we really need to be concerned about people decreasing hours from full time to part time, given that if they choose to do so, it is because they value increased leisure or time with their children over additional income. Put differently, if a program is only available to those who work, should we worry if that program allows some people to work fewer hours? Is our policy goal to maximize hours worked or to support people who go to work?
Stigma/Participation
There may be psychological rewards for people receiving subsidies through filing taxes rather than taking time off to go to a welfare office to determine their eligibility. Tax credits may be viewed more as a reward for doing the right thing-working-and less like a handout to make up for the person's deficiencies. These psychological aspects may partly explain why the EITC gets so much greater participation (greater than 80 percent) compared with other means-tested programs, such as food stamps (see Smeeding et al., 1999) .
In addition, the piggybacking of state EITCs onto the federal definition saves states in administrative costs, and saves families in terms of compliance costs. Some would say that compliance costs are too low, actually encouraging people to cheat-ironically, not comply-with the EITC, in the form of filing by those who do not qualify (false claims of dependent children), or overstatement of earnings for those with less than maximum-benefit earnings, and there is empirical evidence supporting this concern (see Liebman, 1999; and McCubbin, 1999) . Noncompliance is easier under the impersonal nature of tax filing compared with the face-toface evaluations with eligibility workers. It is also easier under a file-and-audit tax approach compared with the heavy upfront documentation requirements typical of assistance programs. Noncompliance is a real tradeoff that should be weighed against the positive aspects of higher par-ticipation; the more money going to people who do not deserve it, the less available to those who do.
Family Formation
The definitions of beneficiary units differ between the tax-based and expenditure-based approaches. With tax credits, benefits are conveyed according to characteristics of the tax-filing unit, which can be quite different from standard notions of family. Although EITC rules do consider the incomes of cohabitating, but unmarried, parents, they do not treat them exactly the same as married parents (Holtzblatt and Rebelein, 1999) . In general, it is much more difficult to collect information on informal household arrangements using a tax form. Moreover, evidence suggests many tax filers do not understand the rules (McCubbin, 1999) .
EITC's treatment of one-parent versus two-parent families is somewhat similar to some expenditure-side programs in allowing families to benefit as long as they meet the income test, whether one or two parents are present. But the EITC does not depend on the age of the parent(s); thus, a minor parent can receive the EITC even if living apart from her parents. Her parents would qualify for the EITC if she and her child chose to live as dependents in the parents' home, but in such a case the earned income of the household would likely be too high to qualify. So the EITC does not voice a preference for one living arrangement over another, but may indirectly impose "penalties" for shared living arrangements, similar to the marriage penalties that arise. Thus, the tax system may not be as effective as expenditure-based programs in creating policies that influence family formation or living arrangements.
The Irony of Federalism
One irony of using tax policy to effect welfare reform objectives is that the largest tax programs are national, while the notion behind welfare reform being converted into a block grant is that policies should be tailored to local needs. At some level these competing views can be reconciled. While most state EITCs piggyback the federal credit, they need not do so if states prefer a different incentive structure. But even in these circumstances, the federal EITC is dominant, and states must take it as a given when figuring out how to meet their welfare objectives. States certainly calibrated their AFDC benefits to take into account the interaction between that program and the federal food stamp program. It is less clear if the phase-out of state TANF benefits as a family's income rises, which varies significantly from state to state, is the result of a conscious effort to create certain incentives in conjunction with the federal and state EITCs.
The Irony of Entitlements
Another irony in pursuing policy objectives relative to the low-income population through tax policy is that tax credits are entitlements. This is taking place in an era when the term entitlement is often used derisively. Yet, all families that meet the criteria for tax credits are entitled to claim them, and along with that comes the risk of budget costs increasing for the government if the number of families eligible rises. These are exactly the characteristics of an entitlement program. Today the states appear to be the primary beneficiaries of TANF being structured as a block grant (since caseloads are falling). But expansions of the EITC create budget uncertainty for the federal government that no longer exists in the welfare arena since TANF is now a block grant to states.
The Complexity of Individual Choice
Finally, tax policy is not necessarily as "hands off" an approach as it might seem at first blush. True, tax credits have the allure of providing families with individual choice, much as a voucher can function. Yet, the more social policy is pursued with tax credits, the more the market for services becomes driven by the precise parameters of the credits. The debate over health insurance tax credits captures this issue. On the one hand, tax credits are viewed as empowering consumers and giving them more choices for their health insurance than they are likely to have through their place of employment. On the other hand, fear that tax credits will not achieve their goal of providing meaningful health insurance to the currently uninsured may lead to calls for greater regulation of the insurance market. Thus, the rhetoric of tax policy as providing greater consumer choice may not be realized.
IMPLICATIONS OF TAKING A "DUAL" APPROACH AND USING BOTH TYPES OF POLICY VEHICLES
Many economists advocate an "integrated tax-transfer system" approach to income redistribution, where all transfers to low-income people would be done via the tax system. This is argued to be a more efficient way of redistributing income, because the informational requirements would be lower and the coordination of policies much simpler. In contrast, a "dual" approach to redistribution calls for some transferring through the tax system, even while much is still done on the spending side. The previous section indicated that in many ways tax-based programs are not perfect substitutes for expenditure-based programs, so that having both might be desirable. But what might be some of the practical problems?
In theory it is easy to imagine that a combination of programs and tax policies can align incentives nicely with social policy goals. In areas where a specific set of services must be organized and delivered to a needy population, welfare programs are likely most effective. Where services are largely available to a population and the goal is affordability, or where the goal is simply to transfer income without any additional behavioral requirements, tax policy can be effective.
Yet, coordinating these policies can be difficult in practice. The use of incentives to change behavior requires close attention to marginal tax rates and a degree of calibration of policies that becomes more difficult the more policies are involved. Institutionally, different bureaucracies are likely responsible for administering tax policies and programs, different legislative committees have jurisdiction, and different budgeting processes are followed. In addition, the effects of economic cycles may be different on the two kinds of approaches, making a system that looks coordinated today fall out of balance in the future. One can imagine states with revenue limits scaling back credits in an economic downturn, while other states might first scale back spending programs. Yet states are starting to recognize that greater coordination can be achieved, both in legislative formation and policy implementation, to at least some extent.
In Practice, Do Low-Income Tax Initiatives Appear to Substitute for or Supplement Programs on the Spending Side?
The differences between tax-based and expenditure-based approaches to welfare reform seem sufficiently large to imply that they are not perfect substitutes. Given that, states might have a preference for one approach over the other, or may choose to use both, as complementary sets of policies. What does the practice in the states suggest?
To get a rough picture of how states are using tax-based versus expenditurebased policies for assisting low-income families, we collected state-level data on total spending on TANF (on both state MOE and through block grants) and total spending on refundable tax credits. State spending on refundable tax credits ranged from 0 to 18 percent of total state TANF spending. 13 We then computed amounts spent per low-income person, and compared the patterns across states. This exercise revealed a positive correlation between per capita spending on tax credits and per capita spending through TANF, suggesting that tax credits supplement (or complement) spending programs, rather than substituting for them.
Some of our more specific findings are that: (1) of the nine states without a personal income tax, seven also have belowaverage per person TANF spending; and (2) states that impose relatively high tax burdens on low-income families (such as Alabama and Mississippi) also show low TANF spending per person, while states that subsidize low-income families through their income-tax systems (such as New York and Wisconsin) tend to have relatively high TANF spending per person. Thus, it seems that use of low-income tax credits occurs in states with a general preference for higher degrees of income redistribution, and that these states do so on both sides of the budget. In other words, it seems that states are using tax credits to supplement, rather than replace, redistribution on the spending side of the budget.
This should not be taken as conclusive evidence that tax credits are not displacing spending programs, however. In order to more rigorously evaluate whether these are substitutes or supplements, we should really track changes within states over time. For example, as New York expands its EITC, will it (intentionally) allow spending programs to contract? Or is the causation possibly running in the other direction: are states expanding tax programs as spending programs contract (for whatever causes)? Or do tax program expansions seem to take place even without (or at least not in response to) expenditure program contractions, hence seeming to supplement more than substitute? These distinctions are difficult to sort out right now, but as EITCs continue to grow in size and number (and as spending programs continue to evolve), they may become easier to tease out in the future.
Other state-level practices that are important to explore are how the tax-side and expenditure-side programs interact at the micro level. For example, how do the eligibility rules for tax credits compare with the relevant expenditure program rules? As a family increases work activity, and hence earnings, what are the changes in the mix of benefits they receive? Are bizarre effective tax rates being created, due to a lack of coordination between the policies?
CONCLUSION
This paper has explored the relationship between welfare reform and tax policy. We find that low-income tax policy promotes some of the broad goals of welfare reform, but is silent on others. Tax-based approaches differ considerably from expenditure-based approaches in a number of respects, including targeted populations, timing of assistance, work incentives, participation, family formation, federalism, and the notion of entitlements.
For institutional and political reasons, it is inevitable that both expenditurebased programs and tax policy will be used to achieve social ends. At the extremes it is easy to make the case for one policy vehicle over the other. It is impossible to imagine the tax credit for home mortgages being replaced dollar for dollar with a government program providing subsidized mortgages. Similarly, it would be impossible to replace Medicaid for disabled children with a tax credit to buy insurance, since there are no privately offered insurance policies that cover the services disabled children need. In the middle is the familiar terrain of political argument over how to structure public support for critical services like housing and education.
There are many social objectives that can be achieved either through government programs that provide services or through tax policies that subsidize families that purchase those services on their own. The political challenge is to balance the use of these two vehicles so that real social needs are met effectively, efficiently, and in a manner that gains and retains political support. The policy challenge is to assure that the combination of these different approaches adds up to a reasonably coherent set of policies and incentives. Thus far, the worlds of welfare reform and tax policy have been largely separated. Given the ambitious social objectives of welfare reform, those worlds need to come closer together if the objectives are going to be achieved.
Our brief examination in this paper suggests that, in the context of welfare reform, tax credits such as the EITC are not perfect substitutes for the expenditure-side programs that are being redesigned. Currently the practice seems to be that tax credits are viewed as complements to expenditure programs in states' approaches to low-income assistance. But over time, if we continue to see an increased role of tax policy and a decreased role of traditional welfare programs, this will imply that the effects of overall tax-and-transfer policy on economic incentives and the distribution of well-being will have changed, for better or worse.
